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THE
SOUL, WORKS AND EMANICIPATION contd...
His argument is as follows:
Moksha is for one who is bound,
and the bond is ignorance and transgression of the moral law (ajnana
and adharma). The Vedantic idea that the soul is never born nor
does it ever die, nor is it bound nor desires to remove bondage,
and being ever free, moksha has no meaning for it; is discarded
by Dayanand. In this respect he approaches the Buddhist concept
that refuses to grant any eternality or unchangeability to the soul.
The soul is not the witness of deeds (sakshi) but the actor taking
part in works and suffering their consequences. The soul is not
the reflection of Brahman. The soul is indeed bound by its deeds,
and this relation between the soul and work is an eternal one.
Emancipation can be
got by right actions alone. These consist of carrying out God's
commands; remaining removed from evil company, evil desires, evildoers,
adharma and ignorance; speaking the truth, doing good to others,
acquiring knowledge, being equal-minded and just and furthering
dharma; prayer, singing God's praises, and yoga; increasing knowledge
and education; and following noble practices which are just and
without prejudice. Since moksha is only a change in the soul's
condition effected by human works, works can also undo it. It is
a kind of gift, which can also be withdrawn. Moksha is therefore
limited in time. There is no eternal bliss for the finite soul.
Even in the state of moksha, the taint of sin can cause the soul
to return to the earth. God only administers the law of karma, he
cannot transcend it.
Despite Dayanand's condemnation
of Buddhism, in his view about karma and moksha, he follows very
much the same ideal. Buddhism did not deny the existence of the
gods, but at the same time held that, like all mankind they too
are governed by the law of karma. They did not create the world-order,
nor can they destroy it. Brahman is all right as an impersonal principle,
but only as the world soul. There is no affinity between it and
the human soul. 'Void is the world' the Buddhist holds 'of self
or aught of that nature'. There is, according to him, no unchanging
spectator, agent or seer, as the Vedantist believed. The Samangala-vilasini
says: 'Anything whatever within the soul, who sees, who moves
the limhs etc., there is not'. No outside force incites one
to good or evil. Pain automatically follows immoral living, and
pleasure moral living. This natural law of justice cannot be suspended
even by God.
Dayanand believed
that the soul can never be equated with God. This as we have
discussed, negates the Vedantic concept of the identity of Brahman
and atman. He says: 'God is eternal, and having power, he cannot
be bound by ignorance and by the bonds of sorrow. The jiva, even
when emancipated, is of limited knowledge and qualitites, and it
can never be like God'. When the imaginary questioner asks that
if emancipation too is like birth and rebirth, what is the point
in labouring for it, Dayanand puts his view thus: 'Emancipation
is not like birth and death, because it is the soul remaining free
of sorrows,which enjoys the bliss of moksha till creation and destruction
does not take place 36000 times. Is this of no consequence? When
you have enough to eat, why do you not still arrange for where withal
to cook a meal, thinking you will need to eat in the future? When
you consider it necessary to arrange for hunger and thirst, money,
land, repute, wife, sons etc., then why shouldn't you try for emancipation.
When one knows death to be certain, yet he makes arrangements for
living, so too, even if you have to come back from the state of
emancipation to the world, to make an effort for it [moksha] is
essential.'
There appears to be
some change in this view of Dayanand from the usual concept as contained
in Hinduism about swarga. According to the traditional Hindu cosmogony,
there are different lokas, or divisions, of the universe, for example,
bhur-loka (the earth), bhuvar-loka the space between the earth and
the sun (where munis and siddhas live), swar-loka (the heaven of
Indra, between the sun and the polar star), mahar-loka (the abode
of Bhrigu and other saints who are believed to be co-existent with
Brahma), jana-loka (the abode of Brahma's sons, Sanaka, Sananda
and sanat-kumara), tapar-loka where the deities called vairagis
live, and satya-loka or brahma-loka (the abode of Brahma) from which
there is no rebirth.
There are various
other divisions. Dayanand, however, as we have seen, did not believe
in the existence of heaven or hell. Heaven or hell was here
on earth and implied joy and suffering. In the place of swarga we
have the Swami's idea of 'limited' moksha where the soul enjoys
bliss till its return to earth at the end of a cycle. But apparently
this enjoyment is not like the pleasure other religions have to
offer. The Satyarthaprakasha draws a distinction between
the concept of limited moksha for a cosmic cycle and the Jain concept
of enjoyment in Shivapur; the Christian one of residence of the
soul in the fourth heaven along with 'marriage', musical instruments,
clothes etc.', the Mohammedan heaven on the seventh firmament, the
Shripur of Vama-margis, Kailasha of ahaivites; the Vaikuntha of
vaishnvas; Goloka tc., of the Gokuliya-gosains, where they enjoy
beautiful women, food, clothes, residence and so forth; and the
Pauranikas who enjoy proximity with God. Dayanand criticises these
concepts in the part of Satyarthaprakash which deals with
these religions.
As regards rebirth, Dayanand
seems to agree with the Hindu view. The soul undergoes many repeated
births on the earth, as Lord Krishna says in the Gita 'As
the soul passes in this body through childhood, youth and age, even
so is its taking on of another body', and many are my lives that
are past, and thine also, O Arjuna. In the Satyarthaprakasha,
when the hypothetical questioner asks pointedly if there is one
birth or several the reply is, many births. Dayanand also considers
the related question of man's first sin.
According to the Christians
man's first sin was to break the Lord's commandment. After God had
created Adam and Eve 'They were both naked and were not ashamed'.
God had asked Adam not to eat 'of the tree of knowledge of good
and evil'. Eve, tempted by Satan in the shape of the serpent, broke
God's command and ate the fruit of the tree, and also gave it to
Adam to eat. That opened their eyes and they discovered that they
were naked. For their sin, God drove them out of Paradise inflicting
punishment on the serpent, Eve and Adam all of whom had partaken
of the sin of breaking his commandment. 'Unto the woman, he said,
I will greatly multiply thy sorrow and thy conception; in sorrow
thou shalt bring forth children; and thy desire shall be to thy
husband and he shall rule over thee.' To Adam, the Lord said: 'Because
thou hast hearkened unto the voice of thy wife, and hast eaten of
the tree, of which I commanded thee, saying thou shalt not eat of
it: cursed is the ground for thy sake; in sorrow shalt thou eat
of it all the days of thy life; thorns also and thistles shall it
bring forth to thee; and thou shalt eat the herb of the field; in
the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto
the ground; for out of it wast thou taken; for dust thou art, and
unto dust shalt thou return.'
Dayanand, of course,
scoffs at the idea of eating of the fruit of the tree of knowledge
of good and devil, being a sin. It is queer, he says, that knowing
the difference between good and evil should be counted as evil,
when it is the mark of wisdom. In the Satyarthaprakasha
a similar point is taken up. Why should people suffer for past works
without having knowledge of them? The soul is incapable of knowing
what deeds were done by it in past lives. He says: ' The jiva has
limited knowledge and cannot have knowledge of the past, present
and future, so it can't remember its past deeds. Also the mind cannot
have knowledge of two things simultaneously. Leave alone events
of past lives, why can't the jiva remember events from the time
of birth to when the child was five years old? Also why cannot
it remember in deep sleep, all its experiences in the sleeping and
the waking state? And suppose one were to ask you [the hypothetical
questioner] what you did at one minute past ten on the ninth day
of the fifth month of your thirteenth year; what was the position
at that instant of your face, hands, ears, eyes and body, and what
was your mind thinking of ? [Can you tell?] When this is so in this
very life then to speak of past lives is mere childishness.
'And, in fact, the
jiva is happy just because it cannot recollect its past deeds.
Otherwise knowing the sorrows of past lives it would not be able
to bear them, and the man would die. Even if one wants to know the
events of the life before and past lives, he can't because the knowledge
and nature of the jiva is limited. God can know them, but not man'.
The questioner then
goes on the question which an obvious corollary of this 'When one
has no knowledge of one's past deeds, and God punishes him for them,
this cannot act as a corrective, for when he knows that he had done
such and such a deed and this is the punishment for that deed, then
only can he realise his fault'.
Dayanand's answer to
this does not really convince. He explains punishment and reward
for past deeds on the basis of incompatibility between human beings
in regard to wealth and poverty, ignorance and knowledge, but one
can obviously not thereby conclude that the incompatibility is due
to acts done in past lives. How much of it is God-made and how much
man made, is anybody's guess. The questioner goes on to argue
that placing any restriction on God's power would not make him supreme.
As a gardener plants small and big trees in his garden and of these
some he tends, others he cuts or uproots; so too the person to whom
a thing belongs may keep it as he likes.
There is no one
above God, so why should he fear {i.e. be restricted}. In reply
Dayanand says 'God does as seems just to him. He is never unjust.
That is why he is worth adoration and is great. If he acted unjustly
he would not be God. As a gardener is a fault if he plants trees
without adequate space and approach, cuts those trees, which are
useful, and tends the useless ones; so also if God acts unreasonably,
he would be at fault. God is by nature pure and just, so he must
act justly. If he were arbitrary without reason, he would
be worse and more dishonourable than a human judge. Is he not to
be condemned in this world who does not reward one who does good
work and punishes an evildoer? Therefore God does no injustice,
and that is why he fears no one.'
The accident, or destiny
of birth has been explained by Hindu philosophers as springing from
works done in previous lives. How else, they say, can one explain
why one is born with the proverbial silver spoon in his mouth and
another in abject poverty. No one bothers to consider such differences
man-made. There is also the very significant factor of human endeavour.
Without effort nothing is possible, and as the Bhagavadgita
says one cannot even exist without working: sharirayatra' pi cha
te na prasidhyed akarmanah. However, Dayanand falls in line
with other Hindu thinkers in attributing differences of birth to
the good or evil works performed in previous lives. In the Satyarthaprakash
he says: 'See one child is born from the womb of the queen of a
learned, virtuous king and another from that of a very poor grass-cutter's
wife. One gets happiness always, the other sorrow.... Secondly,
if these things were not governed by karma, there need not have
been hell and heaven thereafter. For, if we believe God gives
happiness and sorrow arbitrarily not according to one's deeds, then
he can send anyone to hell or heaven as he chooses at his own will.
This will lead to all beings becoming shorn of dharma, for what
will then be the incentive for good works? They will doubt if there
will be no fear of retribution for immoral works. Sin will increase
in the world and dharma will be extinct'.
As regards the question
whether there is the same soul in all living creatures or different
ones Dayanand says the soul is the same but it is sin or virtue,
which creates the differences. The sinful soul falls, while the
virtuous one rises.
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